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We examine the processes by which regulations prevailing in countries at the core of the global economy spread to countries
outside this small group. We show how specific cross-border relationships between banks, regulators, and investors generate
regulatory interdependence that drives the diffusion of international standards from the standard-setting countries at the core
of the financial system to the financial periphery. We argue that regulatory decisions in the financial periphery are shaped by
the prior choices of regulators in other countries, mediated through four specific cross-border relationships associated with
banking globalization. We draw on a new dataset of Basel II adoption in over ninety jurisdictions in the financial periphery.
Using spatial lag models we show that regulators’ decisions over the adoption of international standards are shaped by the
choices of regulators to whom they are connected through the cross-border operations of individual banks, international
professional networks, and competition for capital. Our analysis underscores the value of parsing out the relevant actor-level
linkages that connect countries: while international considerations shape regulatory decisions, what matters is not the extent
to which countries are connected to the global economy but rather the nature of these connections.
Introduction
There has been a dramatic increase in the globalization of
markets for goods, services, capital, and information since
the 1980s, leading to growing levels of economic and reg-
ulatory interdependence between countries. In this article
we examine the processes by which regulations prevailing
in countries at the core of the global economy spread to
countries in the periphery through relationships of interde-
pendence. Specifically, we study how international banking
standards, the Basel standards, spread from countries in the
core of the global economy to those in the periphery. We
find that countries in the financial periphery adopt more of
the international banking standards when they have direct
cross-border relations with banks and regulators in coun-
tries that have already adopted the standards.
We argue that interdependence in the financial system
creates incentives for national regulators to adopt the reg-
ulatory standards prevailing in jurisdictions to which they
are connected through banks and transnational networks of
bank supervisors. Regulatory convergence on international
banking standards is not necessarily a reflection of the suit-
ability of these regulations to financial conditions in each
adopting country. Instead, it is a basis for communication
for regulators who are connected by banks’ cross-border op-
erations or through joint membership in international net-
works, and as a mechanism for signaling to international
investors.
Our work builds on the new interdependence approach,
which seeks to explain systemic international political econ-
omy dynamics by examining cross-border linkages between
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sub-national actors (Oatley 2011).1 Our core contention is
that it is not simply the degree of openness of a country’s
economy and hence the extent of international market sig-
nals it receives that shape regulatory decisions but rather
the nature of these signals. In line with other work on in-
ternational financial standards, we argue that market forces
play an important role in spreading international standards
(Simmons 2001; Mosley 2003a; Tarullo 2008). Our contribu-
tion is to draw attention to the specific cross-border relations
between individual market actors that drive diffusion.
We build from the insight that two countries may be in-
tegrated into the global economy to a similar extent, but
the nature of cross-border economic relationships may dif-
fer. For example, in 2008, Madagascar and Colombia both
had six foreign-owned banks in their jurisdictions. On the
face of it, both are integrated into the international banking
system to the same extent. However, the banks in Colombia
were all from advanced economies that had made consid-
erable progress in adopting the international Basel banking
standards: Germany, Spain, the UK and the United States.
In Madagascar, by contrast, the parent companies of the
six foreign banks were based not only in France, but also
in countries with much less extensive adoption of the Basel
standards: Mali and Mauritius. While seemingly experienc-
ing similar levels of internationalization of their banking
sectors, Colombia and Madagascar were in fact integrated
into very different segments of the international financial
system. This was also reflected in the extent to which they
adopted international banking standards, with Colombia
adopting the standards to a greater extent than Madagas-
car.2 We argue that differences in regulatory change are
driven precisely by such differences and that testing the ex-
planatory power of this argument requires specifying exact
cross-border connections that underpin interdependence.
We focus on the adoption of international standards
by regulators in what we term the periphery of global
1 See, for instance, Farrell and Newman (2010, 2014, 2016), Quaglia (2017,
2019), and Newman and Posner (2018).
2 In 2008, Colombia had adopted six of ten Basel II components, while Mada-
gascar had adopted one.
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finance. By financial periphery, we mean countries that
do not have deep financial systems, are not closely inter-
connected with financial centers, and are not included
in international standard-setting forums. Global financial
governance, including membership of the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (“Basel Committee”), which sets
international banking standards, follows the hierarchical
core-periphery structure of the international financial
system.3 The vast majority of the world’s regulators are not
represented on the Basel Committee, have no influence
over the standard-setting process, and supervise relatively
small financial sectors. As rule-takers, their choice to adopt
the international banking standards is therefore worth
explaining. We demonstrate how differential patterns of
integration between core and peripheral countries, and
among peripheral countries, lead to variation in the adop-
tion of international banking standards among regulators
in the financial periphery.
Specifically, we identify four types of cross-border rela-
tionships associated with banking globalization that drive
the convergence of peripheral countries on the standards
set by regulators in the core. First, as foreign banks enter
a country in the financial periphery, the regulators in that
country have an incentive to converge on the banking reg-
ulations prevailing in the foreign bank’s home jurisdiction
to facilitate communication with home supervisors. Second,
as banks from peripheral countries expand internationally,
their own domestic regulators are incentivized to converge
on the level of adoption prevailing in the jurisdictions their
banks enter, to ease their own banks’ expansion and facili-
tate communication with host supervisors. Third, with bank-
ing globalization, regulators have become part of interna-
tional networks of supervisors, which provide information
and strong socialization effects that lead supervisors to con-
verge on the behavior of their peers. Fourth, globalization
of the banking sector means that banks compete interna-
tionally to attract capital. To attract investors into the bank-
ing sector, regulators in the periphery converge on the level
of adoption prevailing in jurisdictions with which they com-
pete for investment. Although we focus on the spread of
international banking standards, we expect the relational
dynamics involving international firms and key actors in the
global economy that we identify in this article to help ex-
plain patterns of regulatory diffusion in other issue areas,
such as accounting, food, or labor standards.
To test our argument, we draw on a newly collected
dataset of Basel II adoption in one hundred jurisdictions.4
Using spatial lag models, we show that regulators in the fi-
nancial periphery converge on the regulatory behavior of
jurisdictions where their banks have foreign operations, and
that regulators are influenced by the behavior of their peers
in international networks. To a lesser extent, the behavior
of countries that are competitors in attracting investment
is also influential, as is that of home jurisdictions of for-
eign banks. When countries in the financial periphery send
banks abroad, participate in international supervisory net-
works, and compete for capital, they converge on the level of
adoption of international financial standards prevailing in
the jurisdictions to which they are connected. These results
hold even when controlling for other forms of economic in-
tegration and the influence of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).
This article shows the distinct political economy pro-
cesses underpinning core-periphery convergence, which
3 On hierarchy in the global financial system, see Oatley et al. (2013).
4 We focus on Basel II for reasons of data availability but expect similar pro-
cesses to be at work in the ongoing diffusion of Basel III standards.
are different from regulatory harmonization among core
countries.5 Our first contribution is to unpack market in-
centives for regulatory change and show how specific cross-
border links at the level of the firm, as well as competition
for international capital, drive convergence on international
banking standards. Our second contribution is to fill an em-
pirical gap. Despite the fact that the majority of countries
around the world are not part of standard-setting processes,
we still know relatively little about the mechanisms (other
than traditional power dynamics) through which the pol-
icy decisions of governments in core countries such as the
United States or members of the European Union (EU)
shape policy decisions of governments in the periphery
(Farrell and Newman 2014, 355). We draw attention to the
fact that countries in the financial periphery are differen-
tially situated in the global financial system and the decisive
ways in which cross-border linkages between banks, regula-
tors, and investors can shape regulatory outcomes.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The
next section explains what international banking standards
are, and why their adoption (or non-adoption) is conse-
quential, and provides an overview of their global uptake.
The following section presents our argument and explains
how we expect relations of interdependence between reg-
ulators, banks, and investors to influence the decisions of
regulators in the periphery, specifically with regards to the
adoption of Basel II standards. In the subsequent section
we test our argument empirically. The final section offers a
brief conclusion.
How Regulators in the Periphery Respond to
International Banking Standards
There have been multiple generations of Basel banking
standards, all agreed by a group of regulators from the
world’s largest financial centers under the auspices of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel Com-
mittee began with a membership of regulators from the G10
countries and in 2009 expanded to cover forty-five mem-
bers from twenty-eight jurisdictions, including, for the first
time, regulators from developing countries in the G20. The
standards agreed by the Basel Committee are minimum
standards for the regulation of internationally active banks
operating in Basel member countries. Like other financial
standards, Basel standards have been agreed by national reg-
ulators meeting in informal committees and they are soft
law, not hard law (Brummer 2010b; Newman and Posner
2018).
The first set of Basel standards (Basel I) and the accom-
panying Basel Core Principles were introduced in the late
1980s, setting minimum capital requirements for interna-
tionally active banks and providing principles for prudent
regulation. As international banks grew in size and devel-
oped increasingly sophisticated financial products, the Basel
Committee responded with increasingly complex regulatory
standards. Basel II was agreed in 2004, with member coun-
tries expected to adopt the standard by 2007, and Basel III
was finalized in 2014, with implementation scheduled se-
quentially up until 2019.
Should regulators in countries in the financial periph-
ery base their banking regulations on Basel standards? The
answer is not obvious. Basel I was designed for regulating
5 Singer (2004) suggests that political processes explaining cooperation and
the creation of international standards among core countries are likely to differ
from those underpinning expansion to jurisdictions in the periphery. On Basel
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relatively simple banking systems and is still praised for its
efficacy. International policy experts in the IMF and World
Bank encourage all countries to adopt Basel I and associated
Basel Core Principles (Wilf 2017). By the late 1990s, Basel I
standards were the basis for national banking regulations in
more than one hundred countries outside of the Basel Com-
mittee (Quillin 2008). Unlike Basel I, there has been no con-
certed campaign by standard-setting countries or interna-
tional organizations to promulgate Basel II and III standards
beyond the Basel Committee, yet they have spread nonethe-
less. These standards were designed for more internationally
active banking groups with complex business models that
are subject to a variety of risks, including the ones posed
by their own operational complexity (Restoy 2018). Basel II
and III standards are much more complex and costly for
regulators and banks to implement than Basel I, and their
efficacy is much debated, particularly for smaller banks and
for developing countries.6
Regulators outside of the Basel Committee can respond
to Basel banking standards in a range of ways, so the process
of convergence need not be uniform. While Basel I was a
relatively simple and straightforward standard, Basel II and
III are in practice compendia of individual rules. Regulators
can pick and choose which parts they wish to adopt and can
modify the standards to suit the local context (Hohl et al.
2018).
Of course, formal adoption of an international standard
may not result in meaningful implementation and enforce-
ment. Regulators may adopt the standards in name but
under-enforce the rules on their books, effectively leading to
soft defections from commitments, a phenomenon referred
to as “cosmetic” or “mock” compliance (Chey 2006; Walter
2008). Such practices have been documented among Basel
Committee members, prompting scholars to challenge the
efficacy of the standards in changing regulatory behavior in
meaningful ways (Quillin 2008; Chey 2014; Quaglia 2019).
We analyze patterns of adoption of international standards
in peripheral countries and recognize that this may not re-
flect actual levels of compliance. Our analysis helps illumi-
nate the international factors that incentivize regulators in
the periphery to converge on international standards. Ex-
amining the conditions under which formal adoption re-
sults in compliance is an important question for further
research.
The data reveal that Basel II has been widely taken up out-
side of the financial core, with seventy-one of the hundred
jurisdictions for which we have data adopting at least one of
the ten components of Basel II by 2015. However, adoption
was highly selective. Countries outside the Basel Committee
were, on average, only implementing four of the ten com-
ponents of Basel II (mean: 3.52) as at 2015 (Figure 1). Reg-
ulators in peripheral countries tended to adopt the simpler
elements of Basel II.7 The Basel II standard is being adopted
by countries at various levels of development. For instance,
countries that report having adopted all ten components of
Basel II in 2015 include not only Norway and Taiwan (high-
income countries), but also Serbia (upper-middle-income
countries) and Bolivia (lower-middle-income countries).
6 For a review of the efficacy of Basel II and III, see Rodrik (2009) and
Romano (2014). Specifically on developing countries, see Kasekende, Bagyenda,
and Brownbridge (2012), Rojas-Suarez, del Valle, and Galindo (2012), Frait and
Tomšík (2014), Beck (2018), Beck, Jones, and Knaack (2018a), Rojas-Suarez
(2018), and Rojas-Suarez and Muhammad (2018).
7 In 2008, thirty-five to forty-five percent of countries outside the Basel Com-
mittee had adopted the simple approaches to credit, operational, and market risk,
while only twenty to twenty-five percent had adopted more complex model-based
approaches.
Interdependence and Regulatory Decisions in the
Financial Periphery
The interdependence literature conceives of the global
economy as a system, with countries linked through cross-
border connections between societal actors, including firms,
government, officials, and civil society groups (see, for
example, Keohane and Nye 1977; Cao 2012; Farrell and
Newman 2016; Winecoff 2017). Drawing on these argu-
ments, we identify four specific cross-border relationships
between banks, regulators, and investors that we expect to
serve as vectors for the diffusion of international banking
standards. We argue that regulators’ choices with regard
to the adoption of international banking standards are af-
fected by the prior choices of regulators in other countries,
mediated through specific forms of interdependence associ-
ated with banking globalization.
Two of these relationships are created by the complex web
of cross-border operations of internationally active banks.
As we explain below, networks of cross-border relationships
generate market and functional incentives for regulatory
convergence and drive the spread of international stan-
dards. These relationships of interdependence are not sym-
metrical: for example, though there are American banks op-
erating in Morocco, there are no Moroccan banks operating
in the United States. We therefore separately analyze the ef-
fect on regulators in the financial periphery of interdepen-
dence created by foreign banks entering their jurisdictions
and of their domestic banks entering foreign jurisdictions.
The third cross-border relationship takes place at the
level of senior officials from regulatory authorities who meet
through transnational professional networks. A series of pro-
fessional networks exists, typically clustered according to
geographic regions, so they exhibit a different spatial pat-
tern from the linkages generated by cross-border banks.
These networks generate processes of peer learning and
emulation, and contribute to the spread of international
standards.
The final cross-border relationship is more diffuse and oc-
curs between banks and among governments that compete
with each other for international capital and the investors
that supply it. The actors do not necessarily interact directly
or on a regular basis, but, competition for capital among
banks and governments in countries that have similar risk-
return profiles creates pressures for regulatory convergence.
Below we discuss each of these four cross-border relation-
ships in turn, explaining how they contribute to the spread
of international banking standards and providing prelimi-
nary qualitative evidence of their plausibility.
Incoming Foreign Banks
Regulators may implement Basel standards to facilitate the
operation and supervision of foreign banks operating in
their jurisdiction, taking into account the decisions of the
foreign bank’s home regulator as they do so.
When a foreign bank enters a new country and operates
as a subsidiary, the subsidiary comes under the purview of
the local regulators (see, for example, Epstein 2017). From
the perspective of the foreign bank, if the host regulator has
different regulatory requirements from those applied in the
bank’s home country, the bank must operate dual report-
ing lines, incurring transaction costs. We therefore expect
international banks to champion regulatory harmonization
between home and host countries. There is anecdotal evi-
dence of these processes at work. Large regional banks in
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Figure 1. Basel II adoption 2004–2014 by countries outside the Basel Committee
Note: the Basel Committee expanded in 2009 to include members of the G20, leading the average level of adoption outside
the Basel Committee to drop.
to follow Malaysia and implement Basel standards to reduce
their compliance costs (Chee Yuan 2015). Similarly, in West
Africa, Nigerian banks have championed the implementa-
tion of regulatory upgrading in host countries and an even-
tual move to Basel II and III (Alade 2014).
From the host regulator’s perspective, harmonization
with the home regulators of foreign banks has advan-
tages, as it can facilitate home–host supervisory coordina-
tion (Tarullo 2008, 172; see also Stephanou and Mendoza
2005). Precisely because Basel standards are widely recog-
nized, they act as a focal point around which supervisors can
coordinate. Vietnamese regulators, for instance, have been
keen to adopt Basel II standards in tandem to their coun-
try opening up to foreign banks, as this ensures they have
a “common language” with the home regulators of the in-
coming foreign banks (Tran Thi and Vu Thanh 2019). In
Pakistan, the movement of personnel from foreign to local
banks facilitated the adoption of Basel II standards by local
banks (Naqvi 2019).
We therefore expect regulators in the financial periphery
to harmonize with the regulatory standards of home regu-
lators to whom they are connected through foreign banks
operating in their jurisdiction.
Outgoing Domestic Banks
Regulators may also adopt international banking standards
to facilitate the international expansion of domestic banks.
We expect decisions over the adoption of international stan-
dards to reflect the regulations prevailing in the countries
in which domestic banks have foreign operations.
Due to the risk of cross-border financial contagion, host
regulators will seek assurance that a bank is soundly regu-
lated at home before they issue a license allowing foreign
banks to operate in their jurisdiction. International stan-
dards can provide an “epistemic signpost” that assists host
regulators in making such an assessment (Brummer 2010a,
264). In the EU, member states are allowed to restrict access
to third-country banks whose home country regimes do not
meet EU standards. Similarly, in the United States, the Fed-
eral Reserve has the authority to issue banking licenses to
foreign banks only if they are “subject to comprehensive su-
pervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by the appro-
priate authorities in its home country” and if they are “well-
capitalized and well-managed” on a global basis (cited in
Alexander, Dhumale, and Eatwell 2006, 146). In the 2000s,
compliance with Basel Core Principles and, from 2007 on-
wards, implementation of Basel II standards were the com-
mon reference point for EU and U.S. regulators in making
these assessments.8 Thus, while not an explicit condition for
market entry, implementation of the international bench-
mark has been, as a matter of practical regulatory policy, an
important mechanism for gaining entry into these markets
(Alexander, Dhumale, and Eatwell 2006, 146).
There is evidence that, cognizant of this regulatory re-
quirement, regulators in the financial periphery adopted
Basel standards to help their banks gain entry into Euro-
pean and U.S. markets. Chey (2007, 297) finds that Taiw-
anese and South Korean adoption of Basel I in the late 1990s
and early 2000s was due to “regulatory authorities’ concern
about potential foreign market closures to banks that failed
to comply with the Accord.” Jones and Zeitz (2017) find that
jurisdictions where more domestic banks have subsidiaries
abroad adopt more components of Basel II.
Even where adoption of Basel standards is not a pre-
requisite for market entry, regulators may adopt Basel
standards to boost the reputation of their internationally
8 EU and U.S. use of Basel standards as a signal of high-quality domestic bank-
ing regulation has waned since the global financial crisis, as both jurisdictions
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active banks. Improving the reputation of China’s interna-
tionally active banks helps explain China’s over-compliance
with Basel III standards (Knaack 2017). The Executive
Director of the Reserve Bank of India gave a similar expla-
nation for Basel adoption in India: “Any deviation [from
global standards] will hurt us both by way of reputation and
also in actual practice. The ‘perception’ of a lower standard
regulatory regime will put Indian banks at a disadvantage in
global competition” (Vishwanathan 2015).
Overall, we expect regulators in the financial periphery
to converge on the regulatory standards of the host regula-
tors to whom they are connected through domestic banks
operating abroad.
Transnational Peer Networks
Regulators’ decisions over the adoption of international
banking standards may be influenced by the decisions of
peers to whom they are connected through transnational
professional networks.
In designing financial regulation, regulators face consid-
erable uncertainty, making it hard to identify what regu-
lation would be optimal for a given jurisdiction (Romano
2014). Given this, we expect regulators to look to and draw
lessons from the experiences of regulators in countries sim-
ilar to theirs, and to apply these lessons in designing their
own policies, even if this does not necessarily lead to im-
proved policy outcomes (Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett
2007).9 In particular, transnational networks of regulators
can be a key forum in which regulators can learn from
peers.
Several transnational networks bring together regulators
from countries in both the core and the periphery of global
finance. For instance, the South East Asia, New Zealand
and Australia Forum of Banking Supervisors brings together
Basel Committee members including Australia, China, and
Indonesia with non-members like Malaysia, New Zealand,
and the Philippines. While many networks are organized
along regional lines, there are also networks that bring to-
gether regulators who oversee specific types of banking sec-
tors, including the Group of International Finance Centre
Supervisors (formerly the Offshore Group of Banking Su-
pervisors) and the Islamic Financial Services Board.
Crucially, these transnational networks are a forum for
policy transfer. Analysis of the agenda and records of their
meetings reveals that bank regulators use these networks to
share experiences of implementing Basel standards. For ex-
ample, the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central
Banks Working Group on Banking Supervision shares mem-
bers’ experiences of implementing new regulatory frame-
works. It regularly holds joint meetings with the Basel Com-
mittee to discuss the implementation of Basel standards in
the Asia-Pacific region (BIS 2018).
Research on diffusion provides insights into the specific
ways in which transnational networks drive policy transfer,
distinguishing between the process of learning and emula-
tion. Learning is based on an evidence-based evaluation of
practices in other countries and a progressive move from
less effective to more effective policies. While this may take
place, hard evidence of the efficacy of a policy in another
jurisdiction may not always be available (Dobbin, Simmons,
and Garrett 2007). Policies may still diffuse across borders,
driven by a quest for normative acceptance and legitimacy
rather than technical efficiency as policymakers emulate the
policies of those they perceive to be leaders in their field.
9 On dysfunctional policy transfer, see Sharman (2010).
More generally, international financial networks foster com-
mon knowledge and “shared understandings” among the
officials involved, leading them to converge on particular
policy expectations (Porter 2005).
Financial regulators are especially inclined to follow
their peers, since their professional incentives dissuade
them from experimenting with regulation (Romano 2014).
Following “international best practices” and the policies
of successful peers helps insulate regulators from attri-
bution and attendant costs in the event of a financial
crisis (Gadinis 2015, 52). These effects are particularly
strong where networks promulgate specific sets of reg-
ulatory standards, as non-implementation may result in
social opprobrium from counterparts for failing to de-
liver on the group’s regulatory program or shared norms
(Brummer 2010a).
We expect regulators will learn from peers and emulate
each other’s decisions with regard to Basel adoption. All
else equal, where regulators engage in networks where their
peers are high adopters of Basel standards, we expect this to
lead to higher levels of adoption.
Competing for International Capital
The final set of cross-border interactions we expect to shape
regulators’ decisions over Basel standards are interactions
between banks and international investors. These may be
direct interactions or mediated through credit ratings agen-
cies and other third parties. International investors and
other market participants appreciate simple metrics such
as the Basel standards for providing a straightforward as-
sessment of national performance that can be easily inte-
grated into risk-return calculations (Mosley 2003b). There-
fore, we expect regulators’ decisions over Basel standards to
emulate the decisions of regulators in countries with whom
they compete for international capital, specifically invest-
ment into the financial services sector, following a similar
logic to Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons (2006).
When raising capital internationally, banks face the prob-
lem that investors do not have complete information about
banks’ financial health. Banks may therefore advocate for
the adoption of international standards to reassure investors
they are financially sound (Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones
2006). Evidence from East Asia suggests that regulators
adopted Basel I because they believed this would help do-
mestic banks access international credit (see Chey 2014, 59–
66, 102–5, 115). Islamic banks have also looked to Basel
standards as a mechanism for signaling to international in-
vestors. As a senior industry practitioner notes: “One of the
challenges of being a Sharia-compliant bank is that you are
perceived to be very different to conventional institutions.
Adopting standards is a way of banks communicating with
their shareholders” (Alderson 2013).
International credit ratings agencies, institutional in-
vestors, and asset managers may shape these expectations,
treating compliance with the latest Basel standards as be-
ing “positive for bank creditworthiness” (Tarullo 2008, 142;
Moody’s Global Credit Research 2015, 77; Restoy 2018). For
instance, in its assessment of Colombia, Fitch Ratings ar-
gued that the country’s failure to fully align with Basel III
standards meant that “they trail international peers that use
more conservative and globally accepted capital standards”
(Wade 2018). As Alexander, Dhumale, and Eatwell (2006,
147) note, market participants frequently “perceive adher-
ence to [international standards] as a mark of good regula-
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“help them to obtain lower-cost funding from banks and
capital markets.”10
Aside from individual banks’ efforts to attract investors,
governments may pursue the adoption of Basel standards
as part of a broader strategy for attracting investment into
the financial services sector. Established financial centers, as
well as financial centers trying to gain market share, delib-
erately cultivate an image as secure and stable investment
destinations to attract a greater volume of lucrative business
(Sharman 2009). The reputational payoffs for compliance
with international standards are comparatively high, and
governments may thus be willing to bear the costs of compli-
ance to achieve the reputational benefits (Brummer 2012,
147; Ercanbrack 2015, 214).11 As a leading banker in Ghana
noted with specific reference to the country’s implementa-
tion of Basel II, “[o]ther African markets including Nigeria
are in the process of getting their laws amended to improve
their adherence to international norms and we need to en-
sure that we are not left behind in our bid to attract and re-
tain capital” (Owusu Kwarteng 2018). Crucially, where reg-
ulators adopt international banking standards as part of a
strategy to attract international capital, we expect their de-
cision will be shaped by the regulatory decisions of their
competitors. We expect to observe clustering, with regula-
tors from competitor countries responding in similar ways
to Basel standards.
Alternative Explanations
A prominent alternative category of explanations for the
adoption of international standards in the financial periph-
ery focuses on international pressure or coercion. Drezner
(2008) emphasizes the role of great powers in international
standard-setting and expects regulatory convergence to re-
sult from state-to-state pressure. However, there is little em-
pirical evidence of such state-to-state pressure driving the
harmonization of financial standards, with the exception of
Financial Action Task Force standards (Sharman 2008). For
Basel standards, a more plausible mechanism is that pres-
sure is exerted through international financial institutions,
particularly the IMF. Indeed, Wilf (2017) shows how engage-
ment with the IMF helps explain the uptake of Basel I.
However, with the more advanced Basel II and III stan-
dards, the IMF and World Bank do not give consistent ad-
vice. While they routinely recommend compliance with the
Basel Core Principles and adoption of Basel I, they are much
more circumspect about recommending the adoption of
Basel II and III, actively discouraging it in some cases.12 For
instance, in its response to a 2015 survey, Belize states it is
not implementing Basel II on the direct advice of the IMF
(Financial Stability Institute 2015, 4). Conversely, in fran-
cophone West Africa the IMF has been a strong advocate
of countries moving to adopt Basel II (Illy and Ouedraogo
2019). Given this inconsistency in IMF recommendations,
we do not expect to see a systematic relationship between
the interactions countries have with the IMF and their deci-
sions on Basel II standards.
10 This was also the case in East Asia (see Chey 2007).
11 However, for international financial activity that thrives on secrecy and reg-
ulatory forbearance, regulators may deliberately opt against the adoption of in-
ternational standards to signal commitment to continuing this approach (see
Goodhart 2011, Chapter 12).
12 Even for Basel I, the IMF’s impact on actual implementation may be limited:
studies have repeatedly shown borrowers’ ability to avoid or delay implementation
of IMF conditions (Stone 2004, 2008; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; Mosley
2010).
It is also possible that regulatory changes are driven by
globalization and economic integration as such, rather than
the specific financial interdependence we set out above.
Countries that are more integrated in the international
economy may be more likely to converge on what are seen
as “international best practices” in banking regulation.
Furthermore, countries may be inclined to mimic the
regulatory behavior of countries to whom they are closely
connected through processes of broad economic policy
convergence, rather than specific incentives related to
finance. To account for this alternative explanation, we
include a spatial lag for trading partners in our empirical
tests below, as a “placebo” test that allows us to isolate
whether regulatory change is associated specifically with
the forms of financial interdependence we identify, or with
overall economic interdependence.
Finally, although our argument here focuses specifically
on the effect of international linkages on regulators’ deci-
sions, we do not expect that this will be a complete explana-
tion for variation in the adoption of Basel standards. Exist-
ing scholarship has drawn attention to the ways in which do-
mestic features, such as existing regulatory practices, level of
financial sector development, and the power of local bank-
ing elites, shape regulators’ decisions over the adoption
of international banking standards (Ho 2002; Chey 2007;
Quillin 2008; Walter 2008; Mosley 2010; Chey 2014; Jones
and Zeitz 2017; Quaglia and Spendzharova 2017; Jones
2019). In the empirical models below, we therefore con-
trol for important domestic political and institutional factors
and attributes of domestic banking systems that can help to
explain the adoption of Basel II banking standards.
Data and Methodology
To test our argument about the impact of interdependence
and cross-border interactions on regulators’ responses to
Basel II, we estimate a series of spatial lag and spatial au-
toregressive models of Basel II adoption among countries
outside the Basel Committee. Recent applications of spatial
analysis in political science have identified spatial relation-
ships in terms of joint membership in intergovernmental or-
ganizations (Cao 2009; Greenhill 2010), similarity in attrac-
tiveness to international investors (Elkins et al. 2006; Barthel
and Neumayer 2012; Hale 2015), links through trade and
investment (Cao 2010; Neumayer and de Soysa 2011),
and peers on the basis of the level of democracy (Ward and
Gleditsch 2008; Böhmelt, Ruggeri, and Pilster 2017). We use
spatial lags to capture the four forms of financial interde-
pendence outlined above, as well as to control for trade ties,
an alternative form of interdependence. We focus on Basel
II for reasons of data availability but expect similar processes
to be at work in the ongoing diffusion of the more recent
Basel III standard.
Data Description
Our data on Basel II adoption by countries outside of
the Basel Committee cover one hundred jurisdictions.13
The majority of the data (ca. eighty countries) come
from the annual survey of non-members of the Basel
Committee conducted by the Financial Stability Institute
13 Following the convention of the Correlates of War data, we exclude coun-
tries with a population lower than 500,000. We wish to study a universe of
cases that we can reasonably expect to affect “other states’ beliefs or behavior”
(Chaudoin, Milner, and Pang 2015, 304). Furthermore, data coverage for key co-
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between 2012 and 2015.14 The survey asks respondents to re-
port their level of adoption across Basel subcomponents and
indicate the year since 2004 when each component was first
introduced, which allows us to backdate the level of Basel
II adoption from 2004 onwards.15 To test our expectations
about interdependence between the periphery and the core
as well as within the periphery, we augment the survey data
with manually collected data on jurisdictions that are mem-
bers of the Basel Committee, including those that joined the
Committee in 2009.16
Our dependent variable consists of the total number of
Basel II components adopted by a country outside of the
Basel Committee (ranging from 0 to 10).17 The sum of Basel
II components a country has adopted is the most straight-
forward measure of the extent of adoption. Since countries
adopt Basel II in very similar patterns (see Tables A1 and
A2 in the supplementary appendix), we are confident that
this straightforward measure does not mask differences in
the nature of adoption. For instance, countries adopting
three Basel II components tend to adopt the standardized
approach to credit risk, the basic indicator approach to op-
erational risk, and pillar 2 on supervision or pillar 3 on mar-
ket discipline. To further confirm the robustness of our re-
sults, we also report models in the supplementary appendix
(see Tables A10 and A11 in that appendix) that use an al-
ternate dependent variable, which employs item response
theory (IRT) to scale countries’ adoption of the ten Basel II
components.
The analysis is based on two cross-sections taken from
the data in 2008 and 2013.18 Our main results are from
the 2008 data, which is the final year prior to the expan-
sion of the Basel Committee in 2009. This year is appealing
as a snapshot of the extent of Basel II adoption for three
reasons. First, it is a year in which a large number of coun-
tries were outside of the Basel Committee, which declines
in subsequent years as the Basel Committee expands. Sec-
ond, Basel Committee members themselves were only re-
quired to implement the standard by 2007, making 2008
the first year when countries outside the Basel Committee
were confronted with increasing global adoption of the stan-
dard. Third, 2008 is the last year before the full extent of
the global financial crisis became clear, a crisis that chal-
lenged the legitimacy of elements of Basel II. As a robustness
check, we compare our 2008 results to a snapshot of adop-
tion in 2013, which is the most recent year for which data
on covariates are widely available for the countries in the
dataset.
14 Available from: http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers.htm
15 Spot-checking of national legislation and guidelines reveals that the survey
data are generally accurate (see Tabart 2016).
16 These data were collected from the websites of central banks and regulatory
authorities.
17 Rather than treat convergence as a binary outcome of compliance/non-
compliance, our index is intended to capture the range of compliance options
pursued by states (see Newman and Posner (2018) for a critique of studies that
treat compliance with soft law as a binary variable). It is the same index used as
the dependent variable in Jones and Zeitz (2017). The ten Basel II subcompo-
nents are: (1) standardized approach to credit risk; (2) foundation-internal rat-
ings based approach to credit risk; (3) advanced-internal ratings based approach
to credit risk; (4) basic indicator approach to operational risk; (5) standardized
approach to operational risk; (6) advanced measurement approach to opera-
tional risk; (7) standardized measurement method for market risk; (8) internal
models approach to market risk; (9) pillar 2 (supervision); (10) pillar 3 (market
discipline).
18 We analyze the data in cross-sections since we are interested in the extent of
adoption. Our theory does not yield any predictions about the timing of adoption,
so we choose not to use the data as a panel.
Spatial Lag Variables
To analyze the effect of interdependence in the spread of
Basel II to the financial periphery, we use a spatial lag model,
in which the key explanatory variables are weighted obser-
vations of the dependent variable in other units. Spatial
lags are calculated by multiplying a vector of the dependent
variable with W , an N × N matrix of the connections be-
tween units. We choose to row-standardize our weighting
matrices, such that all weights at the country level sum to
one (Plümper and Neumayer 2010; Neumayer and Plümper
2016). What is most important for testing our argument is
the average level of Basel II adoption among those countries
to which a jurisdiction is connected through financial inter-
dependence. With row-standardized spatial lags, the varia-
tion in the spatial lag for each country comes largely from
the variation in the Basel II adoption decisions of its con-
nections. By contrast, with non-row-standardized spatial lags,
variation in the spatial lag for each country stems both from
the number of connections the country has and from the
variation in adoption decisions of its connections.19 Since
our theory is interested in the effect of being embedded in
high- or low-adopting environments through financial inter-
dependence, rather than having many or few connections,
row-standardization more accurately reflects this.
Spatial lags are calculated using data on Basel II adoption
for both non-members and members of the Basel Commit-
tee, since although we are ultimately interested in the deci-
sions of non-members of the Basel Committee, their choices
are shaped by the behavior of jurisdictions to which they are
connected, both within and outside the Basel Committee.




wi j y j
The following five spatial lags are calculated:
• Incoming foreign banks: a dichotomous weighting matrix
that equals one if country i is host to a bank from coun-
try j in a given year. For instance, in 2008, Morocco is
connected to France through three French banks oper-
ating in Morocco and connected to the United States
through the presence of one American bank in Mo-
rocco. In the connectivity matrix, the French-Moroccan
dyad and American-Moroccan dyad each take on a value
of one. The data are recoded from Claessens and van
Horen’s dataset, which provides information on home
and host jurisdictions at the bank level (Claessens and van
Horen 2014).
• Banks operating abroad: a dichotomous weighting matrix
that takes the value of one if there is a bank from country
i operating in country j in a given year. In 2008, for exam-
ple, Nigeria is connected to Cameroon, Ghana, Rwanda,
Uganda, and the UK through the subsidiaries of its home
banks.20
• Networks of banking supervisors: a dichotomous weighting
matrix that takes the value of one if both countries
are members of at least one shared international net-
work of supervisors. We coded membership of twelve
19 With no row-standardization, the spatial lag for a country with five connec-
tions each of which has adopted two components of Basel II and the spatial lag
for a country with one connection that has adopted ten components of Basel II
would be the same. With row-standardization, the spatial lag for the first country
would be two and the spatial lag for the second country would be ten.
20 This matrix captures the interdependence created by banks operating
abroad. It does not allow us to test whether Basel II adoption is driven by the
market entry requirements of Basel II-compliant jurisdictions, since we do not
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networks and forums, all of which include discussion of
banking regulation on their agendas.21 For instance, in
2008 Thailand is connected to 18 countries through joint
membership of supervisory networks, including the East
Asia-Pacific Central Banks Working Group on Banking Su-
pervision and the South East Asia, New Zealand and Aus-
tralia Forum of Banking Supervisors.
• Competition for capital: a dichotomous weighting matrix
that takes the value of one if countries have the same
sovereign credit in a given year. We follow previous
work that has used similarity in credit ratings to iden-
tify countries that are competitors for investment cap-
ital (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Elkins, Guzman, and
Simmons 2006). This is premised on the notion that when
investors compare potential investment destinations, they
compare economies that have a similar risk profile. If
countries are adapting their policies to attract foreign cap-
ital, they are likely to be influenced by countries with
a similar risk profile, i.e., a similar credit rating. For
instance, in 2008, Namibia was given a BBB rating by
Fitch, making it a competitor of eight other countries in
the dataset that had the same rating that year, including
Brazil, Croatia, India, and Peru.
• Trade partners: As a control, we include a spatial lag for the
intensity of trade links between countries, to ensure that
the other four spatial lags are capturing banking-specific
interdependence and not merely capturing broader eco-
nomic interdependence. This weighting matrix takes the
value of one if total trade between country i and country
j as a share of country i’s GDP is in the top thirtieth per-
centile (results are the same if trading partners are classi-
fied by the tenth or twentieth percentile). Data are taken
from the Correlate of War Trade data (v4.0).
All five of the spatial lags that we use in our main results
have dichotomous connectivity matrices, in which pairs of
countries are either connected or not. We test the robust-
ness of the results with alternate operationalizations of the
connectivity matrices, in which we instead define connec-
tions continuously—banking and network connections by
the number of cross-border banks and shared networks be-
tween the two jurisdictions, competition for capital by the
similarity in credit ratings, and trade by the ratio of to-
tal trade to country i’s GDP. These results are reported in
the supplementary appendix in Tables A3 and A4 and are
largely similar to those in the main models reported below.
Control Variables
In addition to the spatial lag variables described above, es-
timation models include the following control variables: fi-
nancial sector depth (private sector credit as a percent of
GDP),22 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, democ-
21 The networks are: (1) Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks
Working Group on Banking Supervision; (2) Group of Banking Supervisors from
Central and Eastern European Countries; (3) South East Asia, New Zealand and
Australia Forum of Banking Supervisors; (4) The Arab Committee on Banking
Supervision; (5) Association of Supervisors of the Banks of the Americas; (6)
Committee of Banking Supervisors of West and Central Africa; (7) Caribbean
Group of Banking Supervisors; (8) Association of Financial Supervisors of Pacific
Countries; (9) Islamic Financial Services Board; (10) Group of French-Speaking
Banking Supervisors; (11) Group of International Financial Center Supervisors;
and (12) Basel Consultative Group. In a PhD thesis, Cho (2013) uses a similar
approach to evaluate the role of international networks in the spread of Basel
banking standards.
22 Financial sector depth is highly correlated with development as measured
in GDP per capita. For issues of multicollinearity, we omit GDP per capita in our
main models, though we report them in the supplementary appendix (see Table
A5).
racy (Polity IV), corruption perception (Transparency In-
ternational), central bank independence (Garriga 2016),
banking sector concentration, and whether a country had
an agreement with the IMF in the previous three years. To
account for gaps in the data, some control variables are lin-
early interpolated. To further control for spatial clustering
unrelated to interdependence, we include regional dum-
mies in all of our models.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the spatial lags
and control variables in the panel as a whole and the two
cross-sections. The difference between the 2008 and 2013
cross-sections is driven by the change in the composition
of the financial periphery following the expansion of the
Basel Committee in 2009 to include members of the G20
and the EU, all of which had relatively high levels of Basel II
adoption. 23 As a result, the sixty-five countries remaining in
the financial periphery after 2009 have a lower average level
of Basel II adoption than the ninety-six outside of the Basel
Committee in 2008. The spatial lags, on the other hand,
have higher values in 2013 than in 2008, reflecting the
increasing adoption of Basel II among countries to which
the countries in the financial periphery are connected,
especially those within the Basel Committee.
Estimation Methodology
Our choice of estimation methodology is driven by our sub-
stantive interest in the behavior of countries outside of the
Basel Committee and our theoretical expectation that regu-
lation is shaped by interdependence. To evaluate the effect
of interdependence, we adopt a spatial approach. Our ex-
pectation is that regulators in the financial periphery will
be affected both by fellow non-members of the Basel Com-
mittee and by members of the Basel Committee, depend-
ing on which countries they have cross-border connections
with. Although we are only interested in regulatory behavior
among countries outside of the Basel committee, the spatial
impulse comes partially from outside this group. This is eas-
iest to capture with a “naïve” spatial ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimator, where the weighting matrix W can en-
compass countries not included in the final estimation. We
therefore report our main results using spatial-OLS models.
Though spatial autoregressive models are often preferred to
“naïve” spatial-OLS models for better accounting for endo-
geneity, these autoregressive models require the units in the
estimation to be the same as those in the connectivity matri-
ces. In robustness checks, we estimate spatial autoregressive
models using the generalized spatial two-stage least squares
estimator, using samples that either include all countries or
drop members of the Basel Committee throughout.
We estimate the models using two cross-sections, one
from 2008, before the expansion of the Basel Committee
to include members of the G20 and EU, and the second
from 2013. We lag both the spatial lags and control variables
by one time period. The main models using “naïve” spatial-
OLS models are specified as follows:
yi,t = αi + ρW yi,t−1 + βxi,t−1 + εi,t
where ρ is a 1 × 4 vector of spatial lag coefficients,W yi,t−1 is
a 1 × 4 vector of spatially and temporally lagged outcomes
for country i, β is a vector of coefficients, xi,t−1 is a vector
of temporally lagged control variables for country i, and εi,t
represents a random disturbance for country i and time t.
23 There are thirty-one fewer observations in 2013 models than in 2008 due
to the expansion of the Basel Committee to include G20 members and the EU.
Since EU member countries are represented through the EU, we also exclude EU
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Entire dataset 2005–2013 2008 cross-section 2013 cross-section
Variables Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Dependent variable
Basel II adoption 2.318 3.127 783 3.500 4.109 0 10 96 3.108 3.118 0 10 65
Spatial lags
Spatial lag: incoming foreign banks 3.722 3.743 783 2.404 1.580 0 5.375 96 6.133 3.366 0 10 65
Spatial lag: banks abroad 1.078 2.152 783 0.892 1.282 0 4.857 96 1.894 2.724 0 10 65
Spatial lag: supervisory networks 1.751 2.182 783 1.031 0.856 0 2.474 96 3.269 2.539 0 7.333 65
Spatial lag: sovereign competitors 1.338 2.487 783 1.324 1.698 0 7.333 96 2.283 3.172 0 10 65
Spatial lag: top trade partners 4.275 2.950 768 2.593 0.369 1.786 3.489 96 7.119 0.690 5.500 8.875 65
Controls
Financial sector depth 46.03 35.12 756 51.31 41.90 2.707 229.2 96 44.21 30.31 5.134 148.3 65
FDI inflows (as % of GDP) 5.626 6.733 765 7.104 7.201 0.0556 50.97 96 5.264 6.529 0 37.73 65
Democracy 4.013 6.071 762 4.760 5.980 −10 10 96 4.062 5.793 −10 10 65
Corruption perception index 61.82 16.33 758 59.49 18.27 6 84 96 60.35 14.00 15 81 65
Central bank independence 56.64 19.13 679 59.44 19.97 13.45 89.90 96 56.61 16.16 14.92 86.65 65
Banking sector concentration 75.37 19.11 747 74.70 20.00 21.15 100 96 74.33 18.83 27.00 100 65
IMF program (previous three years) 0.369 0.483 783 0.344 0.477 0 1 96 0.385 0.490 0 1 65
Results
2008 Results
Beginning with the results of the 2008 cross-section (shown
in Table 2), we find consistent evidence of spatial depen-
dence in the adoption of Basel II, particularly through the
ties created by banks operating abroad and joint member-
ship in supervisory networks. Models 1–5 include each of
the five spatial lags separately, before combining the spatial
lags in single models in columns 6 and 7. We concentrate
our analysis on the final model in column 7 where all five
spatial lags are included.
We find a positive and statistically significant spatial ef-
fect of the interdependence created by the banks of periph-
eral jurisdictions expanding abroad. Holding all else con-
stant, a difference of one component in the level of Basel II
adoption among the host regulators to which countries out-
side of the Basel Committee are connected (standard devi-
ation: 1.282) is associated with a difference of 0.572 in the
number of Basel II components adopted. This indicates that
countries outside of the Basel Committee are affected by
the regulatory decisions in jurisdictions where their home-
regulated banks have foreign subsidiaries. This convergence
likely arises out of the cooperation between supervisors, who
benefit from having a focal point for regulatory coordina-
tion. It suggests that international banks headquartered in
jurisdictions in the financial periphery may be encourag-
ing Basel II adoption in line with the foreign jurisdictions
in which they operate.
The spatial effect of joint membership in international
networks is positive and statistically significant, indicating
that countries are affected by the extent of Basel II adop-
tion of fellow supervisory network members. A difference of
one component in the level of Basel II adoption among fel-
low members of supervisory networks (standard deviation:
0.856) is associated with a difference in Basel II adoption of
1.085 components. Because banking supervisory networks
tend to be organized along regional lines, it is noteworthy
that we find this relationship even with the inclusion of re-
gional dummies. This indicates that there is a spatial effect
of shared membership that goes beyond mere unit similari-
ties within regions and suggests that regulators are learning
from and perhaps emulating their counterparts in these net-
works.
We find less evidence for spatial dependence in Basel II
adoption on the basis of incoming foreign banks or compe-
tition for capital. While the incoming foreign banks’ spatial
lag is positive and statistically significant on its own (column
1), this is no longer the case when we control for other forms
of interdependence.
We also control for spatial dependence based on trade
links but find no statistically significant relationship. The
fact that we find evidence of spatial dependence for
banking-related spatial lags even while controlling for trade
links indicates that the spatial relationships identified are
specific to banking globalization rather than broader eco-
nomic integration.
Turning to the controls, the significant effects are broadly
in line with expectations. Financial sector depth is positive
and significant across models: economies with deeper finan-
cial sectors will adopt Basel II to a greater extent. A one stan-
dard deviation difference in private credit to GDP (41.899
percent) is associated with a difference of 0.629 in com-
ponents of Basel II adopted. In line with our predictions,
corruption has a negative effect on the extent of Basel II
adoption. All else equal, countries that are one standard de-
viation apart on the corruption perception index (18.268)
will have a difference of 0.895 components in Basel II com-
ponents adopted. Finally, banking sector concentration is
positively and significantly associated with the level of Basel
II adoption (one standard deviation difference, 19.996, as-
sociated with 0.96 Basel II components adopted), in line
with the understanding in the literature that large banks
are most likely to benefit from Basel II, since more concen-
trated banking sectors are likely to host fewer, but larger
banks. These results speak to the relative role of domestic
factors in driving regulatory change in the financial periph-
ery. On the one hand, measures of political and institutional
traits, e.g., democracy and central bank independence, are
not significantly associated with the extent of Basel II adop-
tion, suggesting that international relationships of interde-
pendence are more important. Nevertheless, there are indi-
cations that domestic factors related to the suitability of the
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Table 2. Results: spatial-OLS model of the extent of Basel II adoption in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
WyIncoming foreign banks:ρ 0.517** 0.352 0.330
(0.205) (0.212) (0.209)
WyBanks abroad:ρ 0.555** 0.542** 0.572**
(0.255) (0.224) (0.225)
WySupervisory networks:ρ 1.114*** 0.978** 1.085**
(0.400) (0.415) (0.427)
WySovereign competitors:ρ 0.418* 0.396* 0.362*
(0.244) (0.205) (0.214)
WyTop trade partners:ρ −0.698 −1.289
(1.332) (1.234)
Controls
Financial sector depth 0.021*** 0.020** 0.026*** 0.018* 0.021** 0.017** 0.015*
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
FDI inflows (as % of GDP) 0.008 0.015 −0.011 0.025 0.009 0.009 0.005
(0.044) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.045) (0.040) (0.042)
Democracy 0.049 0.063 0.022 0.077 0.062 0.027 0.018
(0.062) (0.066) (0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.060) (0.057)
Corruption perception index −0.052*** −0.053*** −0.072*** −0.043** −0.063*** −0.041** −0.049**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
Central bank independence 0.027* 0.023 0.021 0.018 0.023 0.019 0.017
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Banking sector concentration 0.034** 0.031* 0.030** 0.026* 0.023 0.048*** 0.048***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
IMF program (previous three years) −0.909 −0.769 −0.881 −0.834 −1.157 −0.334 −0.527
(0.801) (0.830) (0.806) (0.841) (0.845) (0.782) (0.799)
Constant −1.888 −0.270 0.573 −0.494 2.881 −3.933 −0.286
(2.496) (2.285) (2.239) (2.255) (3.789) (2.574) (3.843)
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.642 0.639 0.652 0.632 0.622 0.693 0.699
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
sector concentration) determine the extent of Basel II adop-
tion. In terms of magnitude, these domestic factors have a
similarly sized impact on the extent of Basel II adoption as
forms of spatial dependence, with a one standard deviation
difference being associated with a difference of 0.6–1.1 com-
ponents of Basel II adopted, all else equal.
2013 Results
To check our findings, we run a separate set of spatial-OLS
models on the 2013 cross-section, when the sample of coun-
tries outside the Basel Committee is smaller. Results are re-
ported in Table 3. As noted above, we expect these results to
differ from the 2008 findings because of the different traits
and connections among the jurisdictions that remain in the
periphery in 2013. Indeed, we find evidence that competi-
tion for capital is a basis for spatial dependence in the pat-
tern of Basel II adoption in 2013, but that the relationships
created through the operation of banks abroad and the joint
membership in supervisory networks are no longer statisti-
cally significant drivers of regulatory convergence, as they
were in 2008.
Though the spatial lags of interest are positive and largely
statistically significant when included on their own in the
2013 cross-section (see models 8–11 in Table 3), only the
competitors for capital spatial lags are statistically signifi-
cant when all are included in the full model (model 14
in Table 3), while the incoming foreign banks’ spatial lag
approaches statistical significance. Among competitors for
capital, a difference of three components in the level of
Basel II adoption (standard deviation: 3.172) is associated
with an increase in Basel II adoption of 0.834 components.
This suggests that among those countries in the financial pe-
riphery in 2013, the extent of Basel II adoption is related to
the choices about Basel II adoption being made by countries
in similar risk classes.
The comparison of the 2008 and 2013 cross-sections high-
lights differences in the drivers of regulatory change as the
composition of the periphery changes and Basel II adoption
expands globally. In particular, it draws attention to the im-
portance of disaggregating market linkages into the specific
ties created by firms’ movement across borders. While for
those countries outside of the Basel Committee in 2008 (in-
cluding Argentina, Brazil, China, and South Korea) the op-
eration of domestic banks abroad is an important form of in-
terdependence that leads to the spread of Basel II, this is not
the case for those countries that remain outside of the Basel
Committee in 2013. For these smaller economies, competi-
tion over investment is a more important form of economic
interdependence and source of regulatory change.
Robustness: Spatial Autoregressive Models
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate a series of
spatial autoregressive models. While autoregressive models
are often preferred to spatial-OLS models to avoid simul-
taneity bias, they require the sample of countries included
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Table 3. Results: spatial-OLS model of the extent of Basel II adoption in 2013
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
WyIncoming foreign banks:ρ 0.325*** 0.165* 0.161*
(0.087) (0.088) (0.090)
WyBanks abroad:ρ 0.324 0.207 0.200
(0.197) (0.165) (0.166)
WySupervisory networks:ρ 0.472*** 0.293* 0.279
(0.176) (0.174) (0.167)
WySovereign competitors:ρ 0.378*** 0.278** 0.278**
(0.130) (0.126) (0.127)
WyTop trade partners:ρ −0.995 −0.209
(0.878) (0.855)
Controls
Financial sector depth 0.033** 0.038** 0.035** 0.022 0.038** 0.017 0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
FDI inflows (as % of GDP) −0.039 −0.038 −0.062 −0.043 −0.060 −0.035 −0.036
(0.037) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.045) (0.047)
Democracy −0.050 0.024 −0.000 0.018 0.034 −0.023 −0.018
(0.083) (0.080) (0.075) (0.083) (0.086) (0.071) (0.077)
Corruption perception index −0.029 −0.000 −0.026 −0.008 −0.037 −0.003 −0.006
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.029) (0.033)
Central bank independence 0.040 0.027 0.002 0.013 0.025 0.012 0.013
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Banking sector concentration 0.011 0.005 −0.006 −0.011 0.001 0.005 0.006
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
IMF program (previous three years) 0.428 0.305 0.560 0.456 0.121 0.406 0.336
(0.802) (0.833) (0.833) (0.756) (0.828) (0.762) (0.763)
Constant −2.209 −1.848 1.418 0.499 7.654 −2.156 −0.639
(3.240) (3.251) (3.376) (3.251) (7.013) (3.026) (7.064)
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
R-squared 0.391 0.360 0.368 0.402 0.332 0.486 0.487
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
the same, making them unsuitable for our main results. In
the autoregressive models reported in the supplementary
appendix as robustness checks, we first expand the analysis
to consider the adoption of Basel II by all countries (both
within and outside the Basel Committee) and, second, limit
the spatial connectivity matrices to include only countries
outside the Basel Committee. These specifications diverge
from our baseline models in ways that are likely to change
the results. When the estimation sample is expanded to in-
clude all countries, this introduces noise, since Basel Com-
mittee members are required to adopt Basel II, and their
level of adoption is unlikely to be determined by spatial in-
terdependence. When the connectivity matrices are shrunk
to encompass only countries outside the Basel Committee,
this excludes crucial links that are drivers of Basel II adop-
tion, especially cross-border banking links between the fi-
nancial core and periphery.
Bearing this in mind, the results from the 2008 and
2013 cross-sections shown in the supplementary appendix in
Tables A6–A9 give support to our argument that regula-
tory choices are driven by interdependence. The spatial lags
for international supervisory networks are significant across
models and competition for capital has a statistically signifi-
cant spatial effect in three out of four models.
The two results that do not appear the same way in these
robustness checks are the effect of banks going abroad and
the “placebo” trade spatial lags. In the generalized spatial
two stage least squares (GS2SLS) models of Basel adoption
in 2008 and 2013, home regulators do not appear to imitate
the behavior of the host regulators of their domestic banks
abroad. This is likely a consequence of expanding the esti-
mation sample and shrinking the connectivity matrix. For
members of the Basel Committee, adoption of the Basel
standards is less likely to be determined by outside forces,
since they designed the standards themselves and commit-
ted to adoption. When the connectivity matrix includes only
countries outside the Basel Committee, this excludes con-
nections into high-adopting jurisdictions within the Basel
Committee.24 The trading partners’ “placebo” spatial lag,
which is not statistically significant across the spatial-OLS
models, is significant in the GS2SLS models when the es-
timation sample is expanded to include Basel Committee
members, though not when the connectivity matrices only
include countries outside the Basel Committee. This is likely
attributable to the fact that the adoption of Basel II by trad-
ing partners among the Basel Committee is overdetermined
by their joint membership in the Basel Committee.
Robustness: Alternate Measure of the Dependent Variable
In the main models reported in Tables 2 and 3 above, the
dependent variable of the extent of Basel II adoption is
measured using the sum of Basel II components adopted.
While this is a straightforward measure, there might be a
24 In 2007, ten percent of banking dyads in which the home regulator was
outside the Basel Committee had a host regulator within the Basel Committee,
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concern that the index is not sufficiently sensitive to differ-
ences among Basel II components. As a robustness check,
we therefore re-estimate our main models with an alternate
dependent variable that uses item response theory (IRT) to
scale countries’ Basel II adoption.25 Here we treat countries’
choice to adopt each of the ten subcomponents of Basel II as
ten “votes” and use IRT to scale the underlying preferences
of a country with respect to Basel II. Since some components
are much more challenging to adopt than others (e.g., the
advanced internal ratings based approach), countries will
receive a higher score for having adopted these than simply
one additional point on the summative index. The results
from these alternate models (reported in Tables A10 and
A11 in the supplementary appendix) are not substantively
different from the main results reported in Tables 2 and 3
above, supporting the robustness of our findings.
Conclusion
We argue that the diffusion of international banking stan-
dards from countries at the core of the financial system to
countries in the periphery is driven by specific cross-border
relationships between banks, regulators, and investors. Our
core finding is that a regulator’s decision over the adoption
of international standards is shaped by the choices of reg-
ulators to whom he or she is connected through the cross-
border operations of individual banks, transnational profes-
sional networks, and competition for capital. In particular,
regulators in the financial periphery adopt a greater extent
of the Basel II banking standards when they are the home su-
pervisor of banks operating in high-adopting jurisdictions,
are members of regulatory networks with high-adopting ju-
risdictions, and compete for capital with countries that have
adopted more of the Basel II standards. Crucially, we have
shown that while international considerations shape regula-
tory decisions, what matters is not the extent to which coun-
tries are open to the global economy but rather the nature
of these connections and the counterparts to whom they are
connected.
Although we model these four forms of interdependence
as independent from one another, in practice it is reason-
able to expect that the spatial processes may overlap and
have a cumulative (rather than independent) impact on reg-
ulatory outcomes. For instance, following the global finan-
cial crisis there has been an expansion of regional banks
in the financial periphery in response to the retrenchment
of European banks. It is plausible that regional banks have
increasingly similar spatial configurations to transnational
networks of supervisors, intensifying regulatory interdepen-
dence in non-linear ways. In Ghana, there is an increasing
presence of Nigerian and other banks from West Africa,
which may result in Ghanaian regulators being more re-
sponsive to processes of learning and emulation in the Com-
mittee of Banking Supervisors of West and Central Africa,
than if foreign banks in Ghana were from outside the
region.
While welcomed for empirically capturing relations of in-
terdependence, spatial modeling techniques have been crit-
icized for failing to specify interdependence at the actor
level (Oatley 2016). To address this concern, we rely on
actual firm-level linkages to capture interdependence gen-
erated by cross-border banks and membership of specific
25 IRT has been applied in political science to yield continuous measures of
actors’ preferences or behavior based on a series of discrete choices (e.g., voting
in the UN General Assembly) (see Fariss 2014, 2018; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten
2015).
supervisory networks in our empirical work, rather than
broader measures that are commonly used to estimate prox-
imity. We treat the impact of various spatial lags on regula-
tory outcomes as independent to assess the importance of
each form of spatial dependence. Future work should en-
deavor to capture the possibility of (non-linear) cumulative
effects such as the one described above.
Our findings speak to wider debates on the conceptu-
alization and estimation of policy interdependence in the
global economy. Overall, our analysis underscores the value
of conceptually parsing out the relevant actor-level linkages
that connect countries, specifying the accompanying micro-
processes that plausibly shape domestic policy decisions,
and testing these explanations empirically using spatial esti-
mation techniques. While others have used such approaches
to estimate the impact of international governmental and
nongovernmental networks, few studies have used them to
examine the impact of the cross-border activities of firms.
There is potential for a productive research agenda that
investigates the ways in which cross-border relations at the
level of the firm help explain regulatory convergence and di-
vergence in other issue areas, from the adoption of account-
ing regulations, to food and other product standards (see,
for example, Phillips 2017). For instance, global accounting
firms and professional accounting associations have been
central in the design and promotion of international ac-
counting standards and cross-border linkages created by
these firms and professional associations may help explain
spatial patterns of diffusion (Caramanis 2002; Botzem and
Quack 2009; Botzem 2014). Similarly, lead firms in global
food and garments supply chains have championed the im-
plementation of specific sets of private food and labor stan-
dards, which may account for the spatial patterns associated
with their diffusion.26
Future research could investigate the relative power of
individual firms in shaping regulatory outcomes across the
world. Spatial and network analysis has revealed the differ-
ential positions that countries occupy as nodes in the net-
worked global economy. Less attention has been paid to
the relative power of individual firms as the providers of
networks. In the preceding analysis, for instance, we have
shown that individual banks, through their cross-border op-
erations, act as important vectors for the diffusion of reg-
ulatory practices across countries. An important but unan-
swered question is how network power is distributed across
banks: Which international banks occupy positions of sys-
temic importance in processes of regulatory diffusion by
virtue of their position as network providers?
However, a firm-level research agenda faces challenges.
First, data on cross-border relations at the firm level are
hard to obtain and researchers will need to invest in cre-
ating datasets on the cross-border activities of individual
firms and supply chains.27 Second, and more profoundly,
while studying cross-border relations at the level of indi-
vidual actors helps capture systemic dynamics missed in an
open economy politics approach, network and spatial ap-
proaches can have blind spots with respect to system-level
macroeconomic trends that shape policy outcomes (Blyth
and Matthijs 2017). Engaging these critiques will be key
for a research agenda investigating firm-level regulatory
interdependence.
26 On food standards see, for example, Lee, Gereffi, and Beauvais (2012). On
labor standards see, for example, Malesky and Mosley (2018).
27 This study would not have been possible without a unique dataset that
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Our findings have substantial policy implications. There is
growing consensus among international policymakers that
one size does not fit all when it comes to banking reg-
ulation and that countries outside of the Basel Commit-
tee, particularly developing countries, should be selective in
their implementation of international standards and adopt
a proportional approach (Barth and Caprio 2018; Hohl
et al. 2018; Restoy 2018). Yet this well-intentioned advice
overlooks the powerful reputational, competitive, and func-
tional incentives generated by financial globalization that, as
we have shown, may lead regulators to adopt international
standards even if they are ill-suited to their local context.
There is thus a compelling argument for reforming inter-
national standards and standard-setting processes to better
reflect the interests of countries in the financial periphery.28
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at the International
Studies Quarterly data archive.
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